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NOTES
Personhood and the Contraceptive Right
Since the United States Supreme Court effectively legalized abortion
on demand in Roe v. Wade' opponents of that decision have been actively
trying to overturn Roe by way of a constitutional amendment.' Twenty-
four proposals to restrict abortion have been introduced in the Ninety-
seventh Congress.' Although these amendments vary in their wording,4
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 Sixteen months of Senate hearings on proposed constitutional amendments relating
to abortion were held; however, these ended on September 17, 1975 with no action having
been taken. S. REP. No. 126, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1977); see Cohodas, 'Pro-life' In-
terest Groups Try a New Tactic in Effort to Crack Down on Abortion, 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 383, 385 (1981). For a discussion of the early proposed amendments, see Destro, Abor-
tion and the Constitution, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250, 1319-25 (1975); Rice, Overruling Roe v.
Wade, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 307, 321-41 (1973).
1 The following bills and resolutions were introduced in the first session of the 97th
Congress, 1981: H.R. 392; H.R.J. Res. 13, 27, 32, 39, 50, 62, 92, 99, 104, 106, 122, 125, 127,
133, 198, 249, 372, 380; S.J. Res. 17, 18, 19, 110, 137.
Most of the proposed amendments fall into two categories: those which extend con-
stitutional protection to the unborn ("personhood" amendments) and those which merely
give the states or Congress or both the power to legislate in that area ("legislative authoriza-
tiorl" amendments). Most amendments are of the personhood type; only two (S.J. Res. 110
and H.R.J. Res. 372) are of the legislative authorization type.
Four amendments illustrate the typical wordings of all the amendments that were
introducted in the 97th Congress, first session. S.J. Res. 17 has the most popular wording,
and also has been introduced as S.J. Res. 18, and as H.R.J. Res. 27, 62, 99, 122, 125, and
133; it also was introduced, with only minor changes, as H.R.J. Res. 39, 92, and 127. For
the text of S.J. Res. 17, see note 5 infra. S.J. Res. 19 has been introduced in the House
as H.R.J. Res. 13, 32, 50, 104, and 106, and as H.R. 392. For the text of S.J. Res. 19, see
note 6 infra. The third, a combination of S.J. Res. 17 and S.J. Res. 19, was introduced
as S.J. Res. 137 and H.R.J. Res. 380. Its goal was to achieve a "unity" language acceptable
to all "pro-lifers." See National Right to Life News, Oct. 13, 1981, at 1, col. 1. This language
combines the personhood aspect of S.J. Res. 17 and the fertilization language of S.J. Res. 19:
Section 1: The right to life is the paramount and most fundamental right
of a person.
Section 2: With respect to the right to life guaranteed to persons by the
fifth and fourteenth articles of amendments to the Constitution, the word "per-
son" applies to all human beings, irrespective of age, health, function, or con-
dition of dependency, including their unborn offspring at every state of their
biological development including fertilization.
Section 3: No unborn person shall be deprived of life by any person: Pro-
vided, however, That nothing in this article shall prohibit a law allowing justifica-
tion to be shown for only those medical procedures required to prevent the
death of either the pregnant woman or her unborn offspring, as long as such
law requires every reasonable effort be made to preserve the life of each.
Section 4: Congress and the several States shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.
S.J. Res. 137, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R.J. Res. 380, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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many of them define the word "person" as used in the fourteenth amend-
ment as including the unborn child either "at every stage of their biological
development"5 or "from the moment of fertilization."'6 In addition, legisla-
tion has been introduced which defines human life as existing from con-
ception and declares that the word "person" as used in the fourteenth
amendment "shall include all human life as defined herein."7
The fourth type of wording is different from the first three and is intended to return
the power to legislate with respect to abortion back to the states and Congress: "A right
to an abortion is not secured by this Constitution. The Congress and the several States
shall have the concurrent power to restrict and prohibit abortions: Provided, That a law
of a State which is more restrictive than a law of Congress shall govern." S.J. Res. 110,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R.J. Res. 372, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). This type of amend-
ment would not itself confer any rights on the unborn child; however, a conflict might
still arise concerning the contraceptive right if a state or Congress equated the destruc-
tion of a fertilized ovum with abortion and passed a law prohibiting contraceptives which
acted on the fertilized ovum.
This is the wording of the most frequently proposed and sponsored amendment:
Section 1. With respect to the right to life, the word "person," as used
in this article and in the fifth and fourteenth articles of amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, applies to all human beings, irrespective
of age, health, function, or condition of dependency, including their unborn
offspring at every stage of their biological development.
Section 2. No unborn person shall be deprived of life by any person: Pro-
vided, however, That nothing in this article shall prohibit a law permitting only
those medical procedures required to prevent the death of the mother.
Section 3. Congress and the several States shall have the power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation within their respective jurisdictions.
S.J. Res. 17, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (29 Senate cosponsors); H.R.J. Res. 125, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981) (55 House cosponsors).
' This is the wording of Senator Helms' amendment: "The paramount right to life is
vested in each human being from the moment of fertilization without regard to age, health,
or condition of dependency." S.J. Res. 19, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Although personhood
is not specifically mentioned in the amendment, it was the intention of the sponsor that
the unborn be protected as a fourteenth amendment person from the time of fertilization.
Senator Helms did not want other laws which are imposed on United States citizens (e.g.,
census, registration, passports, and taxation laws) to be imposed on the unborn, but wanted
only the right to life to become a constitutional right. See 127 CONG. REC. S574-75 (daily
ed. Jan. 22, 1981) (statement of Senator Helms).
, This is wording from the so-called "Human Life Bill," which passed out of the Senate
Judiciary Committee's Separation of Powers Subcommittee on July 9, 1981. See Cohodas,
Anti-Abortion Bill Advances in Senate Panel, 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1253 (1981). The
bill provides:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That title 42 of the United States Code shall
be amended at the end thereof by adding the following new chapter:
Chapter 101
Section 1. The Congress finds that present-day scientific
evidence indicates a significant likelihood that actual human life
exists from conception.
The Congress further finds that the fourteenth amendment
to the Constitution of the United States was intended to protect
all human beings.
Upon the basis of these findings, and in the exercise of the
powers of Congress, including its power under section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
[Vol. 57:579
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Although the intent of these proposals is to prohibit, or at least restrict,
the "abortion right,"8 it has been argued that conferring personhood on
the unborn child may also outlaw some contraceptives.' Because contracep-
tives in some cases act not to prevent fertilization but rather to destroy
the fertilized ovum, ° this could be tantamount to the killing of a person.
the Congress hereby declares that for the purposes of enforcing
the obligation of the States under the fourteenth amendment not
to deprive persons of life without due process of law, human life
shall be deemed to exist from conception, without regard to race,
sex, age, health, defect, or condition of dependency; and for this
purpose 'person' shall include all human life as defined herein.
Section 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no in-
ferior Federal court ordained and established by Congress under
article III of the Constitution of the United States shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, temporary or perma-
nent injunction, or declaratory judgment in any case involving
or arising from any State law or municipal ordinance that (1) pro-
tects the rights of human persons between conception and birth,
or (2) prohibits, limits, or regulates (a) the performance of abor-
tions, or (b) the provision at public expense of funds, facilities,
personnel, or other assistance for the performance of abortions.
Section 3. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof
to any person or circumstances is judicially determined to be in-
valid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and the applica-
tion of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall
not be affectbd by such determination.
S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Similar wording
has been introduced as S. 1741, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), and H.R. 3225, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981).
' The "abortion right" referred to in this note is the fundamental privacy right of a
woman to make the decision to obtain an abortion as encompassed by the fundamental
right of privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). There are no restrictions on this
right in the first trimester, and only restrictions to protect the safety of the mother may
be allowed in the second trimester. Id. at 163. An abortion may be prohibited in the third
trimester, but must be allowed even then if maternal health is implicated. Id. at 163-64.
Maternal health has been defined in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), so as to include
age and physical, emotional, psychological, and familial characteristics as relevant factors.
Id. at 192. The right also attaches to minor children; thus, parents may not exercise an
absolute veto over their child's decision to abort. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976).
Despite the language in Roe that prior to the end of the first trimester no restriction
or regulation, even for the mother's health, was constitutionally permissible, there were
dicta in the last paragraphs of Roe which indicated that a law permitting only doctors
to perform abortions would not be unconstitutional. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 165-66. This
was confirmed in Conecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1975). Furthermore, in Danforth
the Court held that a requirement of written informed consent prior to any abortion was
constitutional. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67. Therefore, obviously, some
minor restrictions are allowed on the abortion right in the first trimester. The constitu-
tional issue seems to be whether these types of restrictions "unduly burden" the right.
See L. WARDLE, THE ABORTION PRIVACY DOCTRINE 103-11 (1981).
' Cohodas, supra note 2, at 387; see 4 Abortion: Hearings on S.J. Res. 6, 10, 11 & 91
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 237 (1977) (statement of Harriet F. Pilpel, Senior Partner, Green-
baum, Wolff & Ernst, N.Y.) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Abortion Hearings].
10 See notes 59, 66-68, 74, 82-84 & accompanying text infra.
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However, a law prohibiting the sale or distribution of such contracep-
tives, passed under the authority of a constitutional amendment confer-
ring personhood on the fertilized ovum, would infringe the "contraceptive
right,"'" and currently such a restriction is valid only if there exists a
compelling state interest. 2
This note examines the effect of personhood conferred at such an early
stage on the contraceptive right."3 It argues that because of the impor-
tance given the contraceptive right, and the fact that the opposing state
interest would be in an undeterminable probability of the loss of a per-
son (the fertilized ovum), 4 the typical balancing done by the United States
Supreme Court would not allow the prohibition of any currently market-
able contraceptives. This note then proposes a better balancing scheme
which allows the life of the fertilized ovum to be considered a fundamen-
tal right. Under this analysis, which balances the conflicting fundamental
rights involved, the contraceptive right may be infringed, but only to the
extent reasonable alternative forms of contraception are available. Because
such alternatives do not presently exist, this note concludes that even
the latter, more accommodating, balancing technique would not allow the
prohibition of any contemporary contraceptive methods.
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND ACCESS TO CONTRACEPTIVES
The right of privacy first enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut" pro-
i The contraceptive right is the right of the individual to use and have access to con-
traceptives which is encompassed by the right of privacy. This right was most fully developed
in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686-89 (1977). See text accompanying notes
15-43 infra.Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 688.
13 This note is only concerned with the effect of personhood extended to the unborn.
Various amendments, see notes 3-6 supra, contain other language which in combination
with the extension of personhood may arguably allow the prohibition of some contracep-
tives. See D.J. Horan, The Effect of the Human Life Amendment on Fertility Control 7-11
(Sept. 12, 1981) (unpublished paper presented at the Human Life Amendment Conference
in St. Louis, Mo.) (on file in the offices of the Indiana Law Journal). In addition this note
presumes the continuing doctrinal effect of the contraceptive right and the abortion right
as defined by the Supreme Court in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977),
and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). However, in so doing, this note should not be viewed
as approving those holdings.
4 It appears that the right of privacy, which was initially developed in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and which encompasses
both the abortion right and the contraceptive right, has been ranked as a very important
constitutional right. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 935 (1973). On the other hand, the existence of a fertilized ovum cannot
be detected until implantation, which occurs more than a week after fertilization, when
personhood would have theoretically attached. See J. Madden, The Medical Aspects of Birth
Control 2 (Sept. 12, 1981) (unpublished paper presented at the Human Life Amendment
Conference in St. Louis, Mo.) (on file in the offices of the Indiana Law Journal). Because
of this, and because many contraceptives have several possible modes of action that pre-
vent pregnancy, it cannot be determined whether a fertilized ovum was ever destroyed
or whether the contraceptive was the cause. See notes 59, 67, 74, 83 & accompanying text
infra.
'5 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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tected the use of contraceptives by married couples. ' The Court"' found
that the marriage relationship lies within "the zone of privacy created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees,"' 8 and that a law which
forbids the use of contraceptives "sweep[s] unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade[s] the area of protected freedoms." 19 The Court left open
the question of whether a law regulating the manufacture or distribution
of contraceptives would also invade the zone of privacy."
Seven years after Griswold, a statute banning the distribution of non-
prescription contraceptives was invalidated in Eisenstadt v. Baird."
Because the law applied only to unmarried persons, the Court was able
to sidestep the question left open in Griswold: whether the zone of privacy
was invaded by the mere regulation of distribution. Instead it struck down
the law on equal protection grounds, holding that the law did not have
a rational connection to its purpose, the prevention of premarital sex."
However, there was dictum to the effect that the decision to use con-
traceptives adheres to the individual, whether married or single., This
dictum was a significant step beyond the protection of the marriage rela-
tionship at the heart of the decision in Griswold." Furthermore, Justice
White's concurring opinion suggested that this type of restriction on the
distribution of nonprescription contraceptives infringed the constitutional
right to privacy."
,I Id. at 485.
Griswold was a plurality opinion with five Justices concurring in three opinions and
two dissenting. Despite differences in the modes of constitutional interpretation, seven
Justices agreed that sufficiently special interest were involved to require a stricter review-
some "fundamental values" deserved special protection. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 589-90 (10th ed. 1980).
" The Court found various "zones of privacy" in the "penumbras" of the first, third,
fourth, fifth and ninth amendments, and cited previous cases in which the zones had been
implicitly alluded to. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 484-85. The court found the right
of privacy inherent in the marriage relationship to be older than even the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 486.
9 Id. at 485 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288,307 (1964)); cf. id. at 493 (Goldberg,
J., concurring) (the ninth amendment alone would protect such fundamental rights as this
from infringement); cf. id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (this law violates the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, and thus resort to the Bill of Rights is not necessary).
Id. at 485 (plurality opinion).
" 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
"Id. at 449; see G. GUNTHER, supra note 17, at 587-88 & n.3; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 627-28 (1978).
" "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
" The plurality opinion in Griswold was concerned with the direct invasion upon the
marital association itself which would be necessitated by enforcing a law that forbade the
use of contraceptives. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485. The dicta in Eisenstadt
extended the right of privacy and made it "universal in a way that repudiated the legally
privileged status of marriage:' J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE 21 (1979).
" Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 463-64 (White, J., concurring).
19821
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Finally, in Carey v. Population Services International," the Court in-
validated several restrictions on the distribution and advertising of non-
prescription contraceptivesY The Court specifically considered a person's
right of access to contraceptives when striking down that part of the
statute that allowed only pharmacists to sell nonprescription contracep-
tives to adults."s The Court found that the protected right that had
developed over the preceding line of cases was "'the decision whether
to bear or beget a child,' "" and that "restrictions on the distribution of
contraceptives clearly burden the freedom to make such decisions."3
Moreover, the Court found that a law that burdens a person's right to
decide to prevent conception by "substantially limiting access to the means
of effectuating that decision . . . 'may be justified only by a "compelling
state interest" ... and ... must be narrowly drawn to express only the
legitimate state interests at stake.'"31 The Court further stated that
although there is no independent fundamental right of access to contracep-
tives, such access is essential to the exercise of the fundamental right
of decisionmaking in matters of childbearing." However, since a compell-
ing interest is needed to impinge validly on this right of access as well
as to impinge validly on the fundamental right itself, the proposed distinc-
tion in practical terms vanishes.
The Court recognized that a state's interest in safeguarding health,
maintaining medical standards, or protecting potential life may be
compelling.' However, in Carey only nonhazardous contraceptives were
involved, and the Court interpreted Roe as support for the proposition
that potential life is not a consideration in the regulation of contracept-
ives." The implication of Carey, then, is that hazardous contraceptives
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
Id. at 681-82. See generally Note, The Right to Privacy Expanded: State Infringements
Upon Decisions Affecting Contraception Subjected to Strict Scrutiny, 24 Loy. L. REV. 149
(1978).
28 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 686.
Id. at 687 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453) (emphasis added). A few years
earlier the Court had found that the right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
153 (1973). This was approvingly cited by the Court in Carey in support of the statement
that "the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified
intrusion by the State." Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 687 (emphasis added).
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 687.
3, Id. at 688 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155).
3 Id.
Id. at 686. Again the Court approvingly cited Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154. In Roe
the Court found no compelling interest of any kind in the first trimester; a compelling
interest in the mother's health at the end of the first trimester; and a compelling interest
in potential life at viability, subject to total defeasance by an overriding compelling in-
terest in the health of the mother after viability. Id. at 163-64.
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 690:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential
life, the 'compelling' point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside of the mother's womb.
[Vol. 57:579
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can be regulated to safeguard maternal health and maintain medical stan-
dards, and that states may regulate with respect to potential life only
when that interest becomes compelling.'5
Although the contraceptive cases deal mainly with nonprescription
devices, 6 the right of access contained in the development of the con-
traceptive right can be extended to include prescription contraceptives
such as the "pill" and intrauterine devices (IUD). Prescriptions for drugs
and devices may be required in order to safeguard health, and this pur-
pose was recognized in Carey as a compelling state interest. 8 Therefore,
prescription contraceptives should be subject to the same right of access
as nonprescription ones, 9 except to the extent of the state's compelling
interest in safeguarding health. The difference is simply that no such com-
pelling state interest exists for nonprescription drugs." Furthermore,
when a doctor prescribes a contraceptive, he is treating the "health" of
his patient as defined by the Supreme Court.4' In analogous abortion deci-
sions, the Court has stated that broad discretion must be allowed the
doctor in treating the health of his patient, and thus states cannot ar-
bitrarily limit the tools available to do so."
In summary, the contraceptive right is actually the right to use and
have access to contraceptives, which can only be limited by a compelling
State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical
and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life
after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period,
except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
Id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163-64).
" Even though Roe foreclosed consideration of the fertilized ovum as a legitimate reason
to restrict contraceptives, if personhood would be conferred on the previable fetus (which
includes the human fertilized ovum) Roe would be overturned as far as its treatment of
previable life as undeserving of the "compelling interest" status.
See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 682; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
at 440, 462-63; cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 479-80 (although opinion did not
indicate what types of contraceptives were involved, right to use contraceptives, as oppos-
ed to the right of access, was at issue).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 463 (White, J., concurring).
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 686.
"Read in light of its progeny, the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution pro-
tects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.
Restrictions on the distribution of contraceptives clearly burden the freedom to make such
decisions." Id. at 687.
" Id. at 690.
"1 See generally Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (health defined as all factors rele-
vant to well-being of patient).
2 See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400-01 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 165-66. The abortion cases and contracep-
tion cases are very closely entwined because both deal with the fundamental privacy right
to decide whether to bear or beget children. The Court sees both abortion and contracep-
tion as necessary means to effectuate that same decision. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. at 687. Both rights are not absolute, but it is necessary that a woman's right
of access not be limited by anything less than a compelling interest so that she can exer-




state interest. Although access to contraceptives is not itself an absolute
right, an unburdened access is required in order to allow an individual
to exercise the fundamental right to decide whether or not to have
children.
THE CONTRACEPTIVE FUNCTION AND A SURVEY OF METHODS
In order to understand the conflict that would arise with the contracep-
tive right if personhood were to be conferred on the fertilized ovum, it
is necessary to examine the effects of various contraceptive methods on
the reproductive cycle.4" There are three events in the reproductive cycle
which may be affected by a contraceptive. Initially, ovulation is the release
of an ovum from the ovary; fertilization can then occur within several
days after ovulation if the ovum becomes impregnated by a sperm; finally,
implantation occurs several days after fertilization when the fertilized
ovum, now called a blastocyst, attaches to the wall of the uterus. It is
only after implantation that the pregnancy can be detected."
It should be noted that in the natural course of the reproductive cycle
the odds are against a fertilized ovum developing much past the implan-
tation stage. A percentage of fertilized ova never implant, and of those
that do the incidence of an early natural abortion has been estimated to
I Contraception has been defined as preventing the ovum from being fertilized either
by preventing sperm from reaching the ovum or by suppressing ovulation itself. See
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 348, 355, 1250 (25th ed. 1974) (definition of
"contraception," "conception" and "pregnancy"). Recently, contraception has been redefined
by medical convention to encompass any method that prevents biological events which
would otherwise result in the conception of a pregnancy, and thus includes methods which
either prevent implantation or cause the early demise of the implanted blastocyst. See J.
Madden, supra note 14, at 3. Since it would be logical to assume that the Court would
accept the current medical definition of contraception, those methods which also act to
destroy the fertilized ovum would be classed as contraceptives and protected by the con-
traceptive right. The Court acknowledged this view in Roe by recognizing studies and ar-
ticles which "indicate that conception is a 'process' over time." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at
161. The Court also implied that this definition of conception may be more acceptable because
of the action of the morning after pill and the menstrual extraction technique. Id
" J. Madden, supra note 14, at 2. The author explains:
Ovulation is the process whereby an ovum is matured and released from
the ovary.... The ovum is retrieved by the oviduct. Within the oviduct, the
ovum is nourished until fertilization by a sperm occurs. The .. .[fertilized
ovum] is detained in the oviduct for two to three days apparently to allow
for further maturation; the early pregnancy is then conducted to the uterine
cavity. Now the human blastocyst (consisting of approximately one hundred
cells) floats freely in the uterine cavity for nearly four days before beginning
to implant in the uterine lining (endomentrium).... The implanting blastocyst
produces and secretes into the maternal blood stream a hormonal signal (human
chorionic gonadotropin or hCG) that notifies the mother's body that a pregnancy
has occurred.... hCG can be detected in the pregnant woman's blood eight
days after ovulation. The detection of hCG in a woman's blood or urine is
the basis for all pregnancy tests.
[Vol. 57:579
THE CONTRACEPTIVE RIGHT
be approximately forty-two percent.45 Moreover, it is probable that en-
vironmental influences such as tobacco smoking and moderate alcohol in-
take also lead to an increased incidence of early natural abortion. 6
Therefore, when considering a law that would ban certain contraceptives
because of their effect on the fertilized ovum, it must be remembered
that there is already a large loss of this early life in nature. The follow-
ing survey of contraceptives4" compares the different contraceptive
methods with respect to their mode of action, effectiveness,4" and safety.
Barrier Methods
Barrier devices, which include the condom, diaphragm, and cervical cap,
prevent the sperm from reaching the upper female genital tract, thus
preventing fertilization of the ovum.49 The failure rates for these methods
fluctuate greatly depending on the motivation of the patients. Estimates
of the failure rates for these methods range from six to eighteen percent
for the condom50 and from seven to fifteen percent for the diaphragm."
'" Id. at 1-2.
46 Id.
41 This survey is not intended to be an exhaustive study of contraception, but rather
is intended to highlight the different modes of action of various groups of contraceptives,
along with other major differences and similarities.
" The effectiveness of a contraceptive can be indicated by its "failure rate," which
estimates the chance of becoming pregnant while using a particular method. One early
method for calculating the failure rate was Pearl's Index, in which the number of total
accidental pregnancies was divided by the total number of months of contraceptive ex-
posure and multiplied by 1,200 to generate a figure expressed as the number of pregnan-
cies per 100 years of contraceptive exposure. See D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, HUMAN FER-
TILITY CONTROL 177-78 (1979). The resulting figure was generally biased, being too high
for short term studies and too low for long term studies. Id. Therefore, a new "life table
method" was developed which generates a failure rate expressed as the number of women
out of 100 who will become pregnant in a given period (usually a year). Id.; Berger & Jackson,
The Effectiveness of Over-the-Counter Vaginal Contraceptives, in THE SAFETY OF FERTILITY
CONTROL 159, 160-62 (L. Keith ed. 1980).
When possible, the figures in this note represent the percent chance of pregnancy in
the first year (the life table method). However, figures from Pearl's Index are expressed
in the same manner because they approximate the percentages in the life table method
if the study is of moderate length. See Menken, Trussell, Ford & Pratt, Experience With
Contraceptive Methods in Developed Countries, in CONTRACEPTION: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND
APPLICATION 24, 42-44 (Nat'l Research Council eds. 1979) [article hereinafter cited as
Menken]; [text hereinafter cited as CONTRACEPTION]; Shelton & Taylor, The Pearl Pregnancy
Index Reexamined, 139 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 592, 594-96 (1981).
11 D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 133. About 15 percent of U.S. birth con-
trol users (contraceptors) use the condom, while about 4 percent use the diaphragm. C.
GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, HUMAN FERTILITY 73-74 (1977).
1 See C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 74; Barrier Methods, POPULATION
REPORTS, series H, Sept. 1979, at 78, 91 [hereinafter cited as Barrier Methods]; Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, Basics of Birth Control, Publication No. 1253 (pham-
phlet) [hereinafter cited as Pamphlet]. Cf. D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 138
(failure rate of about four per 100 woman-years).
"' See D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 141; Barrier Methods, supra note 50,
at 91; Pamphlet, supra note 50.
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The most significant advantage of barrier methods is that they are
relatively free from side effects.52
Spermicides
Spermicides come in the form of foams, jellies, and creams, and act
not only to block passage of the sperm, but also to incapacitate the sperm
before it can reach the ovum.- When used alone, the failure rate for sper-
micides is about fifteen percent depending on user motivation.M This rate
may be substantially lower when spermicides are used in combination
with barrier devices, but it is generally recognized that the failure rate
of spermicide users is much higher than that of pill users.5 Overall, there
have been no reports of mortality or serious side effects from usage.
However, a recent study indicates that spermicides may sometimes cause
birth defects and late miscarriages."
Oral Contraceptives
The "pill" generally refers to the combination type oral contraceptive
that contains both synthetic estrogen and progestogen.5 It can act to pre-
vent pregnancy in several ways: by inhibiting ovulation, preventing fer-
52 C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 74; D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra
note 48, at 136, 141.
0 D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 145; Barrier Methods, supra note 50, at
77; see Langmyhr, Female Barrier Contraceptives, in HUMAN REPRODUCTION 285, 289 (E.
Hafez & T. Evans eds. 1973). Current estimates place spermicide use at 6 percent of United
States contraceptors. C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 71.
-1 Barrier Methods, supra note 50, at 78; cf. D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48,
at 148 (failure rate of five to seven per 100 women-years); Sciarra, Weighing the Benefits
and Risks of Contraceptive Methods, in THE SAFETY OF FERTILITY CONTROL 343, 347 (L. Keith
ed. 1980) (failure rate of 20 per 100 women-years).
-1 See C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 73; D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra
note 48, at 148-49.
' See C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 73; D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra
note 48, at 148; Barrier Methods, supra note 50, at 96.
5' There is a possibility that spermicides may occasionally only damage, rather than
block or incapacitate, some of the sperm, thus allowing fertilization in this defective state.
The spermicide may also damage the ovum itself. Seligmann, Warning on Spermicides,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 13, 1981, at 84. But see Barrier Methods, supra note 50, at 100.
I It has been estimated that about 22 percent of all married women in the United States
between 15 and 44 years of age use the pill. Menken, supra note 48, at 28. These pills
contain from 20 micrograms to 150 micrograms of an estrogen in combination with from
0.3 milligram to 25 milligrams of a progestogen. C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note
49, at 79. The trend in the United States is toward using pills with lower estrogen content.
Pills with 50 micrograms of estrogen constituted over 50 percent of the market in 1977
as compared with less than 10 percent in 1967. Formulation with less than 50 micrograms
of estrogen accounted for about 18 percent of the market in 1977. The use of 100-microgram
and 80-microgram formulations had dropped to 25 percent of the market in 1977, down
from 43.6 percent in 1973. Oral Contraceptives, POPULATION REPORTS, series A, Jan. 1979,
at 136 [hereinafter cited as Oral Contraceptives].
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tilization, or preventing implantation.5 ' The principal mode of action is
to suppress ovulation;" however, it appears that at lower dosages the
other modes of action are necessary to prevent pregnancy. 1 The primary
advantage of the pill is its effectiveness, for its estimated failure rate
is about two percent.2 The major disadvantage of the pill is its connec-
tion with increased user risk of thromboembolic complications,
cerebrovascular disease, cardiovascular disease, and circulatory system
diseases, all of which lead to an increased death rate among users,63
although it has been found that a lower dosage will decrease the incidence
of some of these side effects.' However, women with certain medical con-
ditions, such as hypertension, renal disease, or cardiovascular disease,
should never use the pill because of the increased mortality rate associated
with these conditions. 5
The "minipill" is a daily oral contraceptive which contains a small quan-
tity of progestogen only, rather than a combination of progestogen and
estrogen.6 While the possible modes of action are the same as those of
the regular pill," the primary mode of action is to prevent implantation.
11 C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 79-80; see Moghissi, The Effect of
Steroidal Contraceptives on the Reproductive System, in HUMAN REPRODUCTION 559, 568-81
(E. Hafez & T. Evans eds. 1973). But see D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 52
(pills of low hormone dosage seem to have no effect on sperm penetration).
0 D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 52-53; J. Madden, supra note 14, at 4-5.
61 D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 53; J. Madden, supra note 14, at 5.
Menken, supra note 48, at 32; Pamphlet, supra note 50; cf. C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD,
supra note 49, at 65 (estimates the failure rate by Pearl Index to be from four to seven
failures per 100 women-years).
3 See D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 69-75; Connell, Thromboembolic
Phenomena and Oral Contraceptives, in THE SAFETY OF FERTILITY CONTROL 68, 69-72 (L. Keith
ed. 1980); Oral Contraceptives, supra note 58, at 133, 146. But cf. C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD,
supra note 49, at 81-82, 86-87 (many reported side effects could be related to other factors,
and relative risk of pill is actually very low); Ory, The Health Effects of Fertility Control,
in CONTRACEPTION, supra note 48, at 110, 115-17. (incidence of four diseases is reduced by
use of pill: benign breast lumps; ovarian cysts; iron deficiency anemia; and rheumatoid
arthritis).
Risks are magnified by cigarette smoking and by the duration of use. See, Connell, supra,
at 70-72; Oral Contraceptives, supra note 58, at 133.
" J. Madden, supra note 14, at 4-5. See Connell, supra note 63, at 70. Estrogen seems
to be the culprit in causing many of these side effects. See D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra
note 48, at 75; Connell, supra note 63, at 70; Kent & Nissen, Metabolic Effects of Oral Con-
traceptives, in THE SAFETY OF FERTILITY CONTROL 57, 59 (L. Keith ed. 1980). Therefore,
"clinical prudence dictates maintaining patients on the lowest dosage oral contraceptive
tolerated." Kent & Nissen, supra, at 61.
" See C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 96; D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra
note 48, at 69-75; Kent & Nissen, supra note 64, at 62.
6 C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 98. Its present usage is very low. See
J. Madden, supra note 14, at 5.
" C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 98; Moghissi, Newer Approaches to
Steroidal Contraceptives, in HUMAN REPRODUCTION 447, 456-57 (E. Hafez & T. Evans eds.
1973) [hereinafter cited as Moghissi, Newer Approaches]; see J. Madden, supra note 14, at 5.
" See D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 98. The minipill inhibits ovulation
in only 15 percent to 40 percent of cycles. J. Madden, supra note 14, at 5; see C. GARCIA
& D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 98; Moghissi, Newer Approaches, supra note 67, at 448.
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The minipill's estimated failure rate, ranging from 4.1 percent to 5.8
percent,' is higher than the pill's, but is similar to the IUD's. The minipill
compares unfavorably to the pill because an omission of a single minipill
can result in conception, whereas an omission of a single regular pill prob-
ably will not.7 ' The major advantage of the minipill is that it is devoid
of most of the side effects commonly attributed to the pill;7' however,
a high percentage of users experience abnormal bleeding and a lack of
cycle control.71
The "morning after pill" contains high doses of estrogen and is given
over several days after intercourse, usually in emergency situations.' This
high estrogen dose probably acts to prevent fertilization or implantation."
It does not interfere with ovulation, nor does it cause the abortion of
an implanted blastocyst.75 The failure rate ranges from zero to 2.4 percent,
with effectiveness depending upon administration within twenty-four to
seventy-two hours after exposure to unprotected intercourse.71 Side ef-
fects such as nausea, vomiting, headaches, dizziness, and menstrual distur-
bances occur in over half of the patients.7 7 The Federal Drug Administra-
tion considers use of the morning after pill to be limited to emergencies,
and warns against use as a routine contraceptive." The large dose of
estrogen may also cause congenital abnormalities if pregnancy continues.7'
Intrauterine Devices
Intrauterine devices are polyethylene devices of different configura-
tions, sometimes containing a medicational coating, which are inserted
into the uterus by a physician." The IUD can remain inserted for long
It is debatable whether there is much inhibition of sperm migration. Compare Moghissi,
supra note 67, at 454-55, with D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 97.
0 D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 101; see Moghissi, Newer Approaches, supra
note 67, at 460.
7o As ovulation is not always suppressed by the minipill, the omission of one minipill
at a crucial time may allow fertilization or implantation if its other modes of action do
not operate. D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 100. The omission of one regular
pill would not have any effect as long as a number sufficient to prevent ovulation had
been taken previously. Id.
71 Id. at 99; Moghissi, Newer Approaches, supra note 67, at 460.
' Moghissi, Newer Approaches, supra note 67, at 460; J. Madden, supra note 14, at 5.
11 C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 100. Often DES (diethylstilbestrol) is
used in daily 50 milligram doses for five days after intercourse. Id.; Yuzpe, Postcoital Con-
traception, in THE SAFETY OF FERTILITY CONTROL 289, 291 (L. Keith ed. 1980).
11 C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 100; D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra
note 48, at 115; see Yuzpe, supra note 73, at 293-94; J. Madden, supra note 14, at 8.
C 0. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 100; J. Madden, supra note 14, at 8.
" Yuzpe, supra note 73, at 291. See D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 115-16.
C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 100; see Yuzpe, supra note 73, at 290.
78 C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 102; D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra
note 48, at 116; J. Madden, supra note 14, at 8.
71 D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 116.
80 See, D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 180-83; J. Madden, supra note 14,
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periods of time without being replaced.' It has been suggested that the
IUD may prevent fertilization or destroy the fertilized ovum by
stimulating a foreign body reaction.2 It may also prevent implantation
or cause the abortion of a recently implanted blastocyst.' Its primary
mode of action seems to be the prevention of implantation. 4 While the
IUD's failure rate is six percent or less,' there are associated health risks.
About two in every 1,000 users require hospitalization for a condition
caused by IUD use, compared to only one in 1,000 oral contraceptive
users." The death rate of IUD users, approximately one to ten deaths
per million users per year, is also comparable to that of oral contracep-
tive users.Y Women who have a history of pelvic infection, abnormal pap
smears, hypermenorrhea, dysmenorrhea, or uterine abnormalities should
not use the IUD.'
Experimental Contraceptives
Depo Provera is a relatively new contraceptive being used in certain
at 5. It is estimated that there are approximately two million users in the United States.
LU.D. Debate, TIME, May 26, 1980, at 60. Use of the IUD among married women in the
United States in 1976 was estimated at six percent. Menken, supra note 48, at 30.
8 Newton, IUD Update, FAMILY HEALTH, May 1981, at 56.
It is possible that in response to a foreign body reaction white blood cells and
macrophages may consume the sperm or the fertilized ovum. See D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER,
supra note 48, at 166-67; Moyer & Shaw, Intrauterine Devices, in HUMAN REPRODUCTION
310 (E. Hafez & T. Evans eds. 1973); J. Madden, supra note 14, at 7.
" D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 169-70; see Moyer & Shaw, supra note
82, at 310; J. Madden, supra note 14, at 7.
.LU.D. Debate, supra note 80, at 57; see J. Madden, supra note 14, at 7. There is no
evidence that the IUD interferes with ovulation. C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note
49, at 102; J. Madden, supra note 14, at 7. It is also questionable whether the IUD con-
sistently. prevents sperm from reaching the site of fertilization. See D. HAWKINS & M.
ELDER, supra note 48, at 166; J. Madden, supra note 14, at 7.
"See Menken, supra note 48, at 32; Tyrer, The Benefits and Risks of Intrauterine Devices,
in THE SAFETY OF FERTILITY CONTROL 117, 120-21 (L. Keith ed. 1980); J. Madden, supra
note 14, at 6.
' Tyrer, supra note 85, at 118. IUD users seem to be two to seven times more suscepti-
ble to pelvic infections (which can cause sterility) than nonusers. Ory, supra note 63, at
117; see D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 222-23; Tyrer, supra note 85, at 120.
Users have about six times the risk of an ectopic pregnancy. Ory, supra note 63, at 117;
see C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 104; D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note
48, at 226-27; ef. Tyrer, supra note 85, at 121 (copper containing IUD has significantly lower
ectopic pregnancy rate than inert IUD). Users tend to be 25 to 75 times more susceptible
to septic spontaneous abortion than nonusers. Ory, supra note 63, at 117; see Tyrer, supra
note 85, at 121; J. Madden, supra note 14, at 6.
" D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note 48, at 229; J. Madden, supra note 14, at 6. But
ef. Ory, supra note 63, at 114 (IUD mortality rate much lower than that of pill users). A
type of IUD, the Dalkon Shield, was taken off the market after four patients who became
pregnant with the device in place died from sepsis. D. HAWKINS & M. ELDER, supra note
48, at 182.11 Tyrer, supra note 85, at 117-18.
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parts of the world, but is not presently available in the United States. 9
It is an intramuscular injection of a long acting progesterone which need
only be administered at intervals of from three to six months. Its possi-
ble actions include suppressing ovulation, preventing implantation, and
preventing fertilization by inhibiting sperm penetration of the cervical
mucus. 1 It has been suggested that the drug primarily inhibits ovulation.'
Foreign studies indicate a failure rate of less than one percent;93 however,
side effects include irregular bleeding, amenorrhea after discontinuation,
and possible infertility.94 Long-term effects on organs have not been
determined.95
The prostaglandin pill' is a new experimental oral contraceptive which
has to be taken only once a month. 7 It prevents pregnancy either by
preventing implantation or by causing an early abortion of the implanted
blastocyst depending on the time during the menstrual cycle at which
the drug is given. 8 Preliminary studies on animals have shown no side
effects,99 and the failure rate is estimated to be zero.10
In summary, all presently available contraceptive methods except bar-
rier methods and spermicides probably destroy the fertilized ovum in some
instances. This probably occurs more frequently with the minipill, the
morning after pill, and the IUD than with the pill. The primary mode
of action of the morning after pill is probably to prevent implantation,
which destroys the fertilized ovum. Of the two future contraceptives, the
prostaglandin pill acts to destroy a fertilized ovum, and Depo Provera
primarily acts to suppress ovulation in a manner similar to the pill.
While barrier methods and spermicides are the safest contraceptives,
they also have the highest failure rates. The "pill" has the lowest failure
rate but has a sizeable health risk and certain persons should not use
this method. As alternatives to the pill, the minipill and IUD have two
to three times the failure rate and their own peculiar health risks. Depo
I Ellinas, Medroxyprogesterone Acetate (Depo Provera), in THE SAFETY OF FERTILITY CON-
TROL 104 (L. Keith ed. 1980). See C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 98.
o C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 98; see Ellinas, supra note 89, at 104.
II C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 98.
92 Ellinas, supra note 89, at 104.
9 Id. at 106.
C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 98-99. See Ellinas, supra note 89, at
106-09.
's C. GARCIA & D. ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 99.
The synthetic chemical used in this pill is one of many substances in the family of
prostaglandins. Jeffery, Birth Control News, HARPER'S BAZAAR, Aug. 1978, at 24. It should
not be confused with other types of prostaglandins, which are presently used for second
trimester abortions, and are also licensed for other medical uses. Id. See C. GARCIA & D.
ROSENFELD, supra note 49, at 148-49 (prostaglandin compounds used for abortions).
Jeffery, supra note 96, at 24.
Id. at 24, 146; see Segal, Methods of Fertility Regulation in Clinical Trial, in CONTRACEP-
TION, supra note 48, at 138.
Jeffery, supra note 96, at 146; see J. Madden, supra note 14, at 8.
10 See Jeffery, supra note 96, at 24, 146.
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Provera has a lower failure rate but health risks similar to the IUD, while
the prostaglandin pill has shown relatively no side effects and a failure
rate of zero.
BALANCING A LIFE PROBABILITY
A problem presented by defining a fertilized ovum to be a person is
that contraceptives which allow ovulation and fertilization but prevent
implantation would result in the killing of such a person. However, laws
prohibiting the sale and distribution of such contraceptives would infringe
upon the fundamental right to decide whether to bear or beget a child.' °
This conflict necessitates a reconciliation of several interests: first, the
right of privacy as it encompasses the contraceptive right must be bal-
anced against the state's interest in the life of a fourteenth amendment
person; and second, the contraceptive right and the right to life of a fer-
tilized ovum, as a person, must both be accommodated.
There are two balancing techniques the Court has used when faced
with competing interests which may be applied in this situation. The first
technique, the "judicial balance," determines whether the infringed right
or the opposing state interest should prevail. The second technique
recognizes the existence of two fundamental rights and tries to "accom-
modate" each.
The Judicial Balance
The first technique, which has been used for substantive due process
review, looks at the purported state interest to determine if it is suffi-
ciently important to validly burden a fundamental right.' In practical
"I Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See text accompanying notes
15-43 supra.
02 The substantive guarantee of due process has generally required that laws bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate state goal, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
supra note 22, at 404; however, in United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938),
Justice Stone intimated that a closer scrutiny should be made of laws restricting constitu-
tional rights, restricting the political process, or prejudicing discrete and insular minorities.
Id. at 152-53 n.4. Stricter scrutiny was soon applied to laws which infringed particular rights
contained in the Bill of Rights that the Court determined were fundamental and therefore
applicable to the states by means of incorporation into the fourteenth amendment. The
tests for being considered fundamental in this incorporation process ranged from a right
so fundamental as to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," or "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be as fundamental," Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), to a right "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," Dun-
can v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968). Today, most of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights have been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, thus becoming "fundamen-
tal" and therefore protected by a stricter form of review. See J. NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 414-16.
Currently, fundamental rights can only be limited if there is a "compelling state interest."
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155. The most recent step in substantive due process analysis
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terms this is a judicial balance of competing interests; however, because
one interest is armed with the shield of "fundamental rights" language,
the state interest carries a heavy burden of justification."3
This type of balancing technique is prevalent in cases concerning the
privacy right."' The Court in Carey recognized that a compelling state
has been to "deem" certain individual rights to be fundamental even though there exists
no specific textual basis for them in the Constitution. Among these rights is the right
of privacy, which encompasses the "abortion right" and the "contraceptive right." See J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 404-19.
10 One theory behind this type of balancing suggests that the Court is making a decision
as to whom to allocate decisionmaking power with respect to the right in question. Pro-
fessor Tribe provided the best explanation of this theory when he drew from an earlier
classic article on role allocation, Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the
Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755 (1963), and applied it to the detailed
balancing done by the Court in Roe. See Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword:
Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973).
In role allocation, "the due process clause is violated whenever the state either assumes
a role the Constitution entrusts to another, or fails to assume a role the Constitution im-
poses upon it." Id. at 15. Tribe felt that the decision to obtain an abortion was the type
of choice which ought to be left to the individual, without government intervention. Id. at 32.
It is interesting to note that although Tribe argued that Roe is acceptable constitutional
law when based on this type of role allocation, he felt the actual Court balancing in Roe
was not of this nature. Id. at 50-52.
Another theory suggests that the Court allocates the decisionmaking role to itself when
dealing with issues involving personal liberties and then ascertains the weights of com-
peting moral principles in the light of conventional morality.
An extensive analysis of this theory behind "judicial balancing" can be found in Wellington,
Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83
YALE L.J. 221 (1973). In discussing the seeming double standard of review between
economic regulation cases and personal liberty cases, Professor Wellington distinguished
them not on that basis but rather as distinguishing between "policies" and "principles."
Id. at 222-29, 284-85, 302-04.
Wellington felt that when a principle is involved in a dispute, the Court should ascertain
the weight of the principle in "conventional morality" and convert the moral principle into
a legal one by connecting it with the body of constitutional law. Id. at 284. Thus, in Roe
the Court had to determine the weights of both the state's claim of protecting potential
human life (a principle) and the woman's interest in her liberty (a principle)-the weight
to be determined with respect to conventional morality. Id. at 302-03.
Interestingly, the subjectivity of this type of balancing becomes evident when Wellington
concluded that his concept of conventional morality agreed only partly with the Model
Penal Code (in 1973), and that both the Model Penal Code and the Supreme Court went
beyond the bounds of conventional morality as he appraised it. Id. at 310-11.
Under either theory, the Court decides whether the competing state interest outweighs
the fundamental right it infringes. It either directly determines (from its perception of
conventional morality) the appropriate weight to be given each interest, or the Court allocates
the decision to one of the parties involved, in effect determining the weight of the com-
peting interests.
104 The privacy cases implicitly apply such a technique:
[Tihe same test must be applied to state regulations that burden an individual's
right to decide to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by substantially
limiting access to the means of effectuating that decision as is applied to state
statutes that prohibit the decision entirely. Both types of regulation "may
be justified only by a compelling state interest.., and ... must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake."




interest which would allow a limitation on the access to contraceptives
may exist. °5 However, the Court decided that the state's interest in pro-
tecting maternal health was outweighed by the necessity of access to con-
traceptives because the suspect law dealt only with nonhazardous
contraceptives."" The Court also found that the state's interest in protect-
ing potential life was not "implicated" in the state regulation of contra-
ceptives."0 ' The Court based this conclusion on the finding in Roe that
the state has no compelling interest in a previable fetus."0 ' This implies
that the Court recognized that regardless of any potential harm to the
fertilized ovum, there was not a sufficient interest in this stage of fetal
life to infringe upon the contraceptive right."9
Roe itself is a prime example of the judicial balance technique. The Roe
Court allocated the decisionmaking power to different parties at different
stages of fetal gestation."' After the first trimester the state's interest
in maternal health "outweighed" the decision to abort, but only to the
extent of licensing the physician or clinic to ensure a "safe" abortion for
the mother.' Before that point, no state interest outweighed the abor-
tion right,1 2 and only after viability did the state's interest in protecting
fetal life become sufficiently compelling to outweigh the decision to abort.1
However, the Court did a secondary balancing and held that in the third
trimester a compelling interest in fetal life did not outweigh the state's
interest in preserving maternal health.1 For obvious reasons this type
of balancing has come under severe criticism for its judicial subjectivity.1
However, the judicial balance technique is likely to be applied to the con-
115 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 686.
' Id. at 690.
107 Id.
,08 Id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163-64). See note 34 & accompanying text supra.
The Court in Roe found that the state's interest in the fetus does not become compelling
until viability. At that point the fetus "presumably has the capability of meaningful life,
outside the mother's womb" and the protection of such fetal life has "both logical andI
biological justifications." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
" If the state has no compelling interest in fetal life before viability, it could have no
compelling interest in the fertilized ovum.
110 See notes 102-109 & accompanying text supra.
' Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
I The Court held that the state cannot use its interest in maternal health to prohibit,
abortions in the first trimester because the Court found as a fact that abortion in the first
trimester is safer for the woman than giving birth. Moreover, because the Court found
that prenatal life must be "meaningful" before the state has an interest in protecting it,
no state law prohibiting abortions in the first trimester could be based on the state's in-
terest in protecting unborn life. Id. For a discussion of the abortion right, see note 8 supra.
1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163. See note 108 supra.
1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
111 See J. NONAN, supra note 24; L.D. WARDLE, supra note 8; Destro, supra note 2; Ely,
supra note 14; Gorby, The "Right" to an Abortion, The Scope of Fourteenth Amendment
"Personhood," and the Supreme Court's Birth Requirment, 1979 S. ILL. U.L.J. 1; Rice, supra
note 2. But see Barzelay & Heymann, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics,
53 B.U.L. REv. 765 (1973); Tribe, supra note 103.
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flict between the personhood amendments and the contraceptive right,
as the question is analogous to that presented in Roe.
Initially, the effect on the contraceptive right of conferring personhood
on the fertilized ovum would depend on the effect of fetal personhood
on the right to abort. Specifically, the question that would be presented
is whether the viable-previable distinction would continue, or whether
fetal personhood would give the state a compelling interest which would
completely outweigh the right to abort. If fetal personhood would make
no difference to the previous balancing done in Roe, then by default, no
adjustment need be made to the Court's reasoning in Carey; and therefore,
no restriction on the sale or distribution of any contraceptive could be
maintained based on a state's interest in protecting the life of a prenatal
person. The dicta in Roe, however, stated that if such personhood were
established, "the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifical-
ly by the Fourteenth Amendment.""' This would bestow a compelling
interest in the life of the fetus and consequently the fertilized ovum,"7
and the balancing easily sidestepped in Carey would have to be done." 8
However, the fundamental right to decide whether to bear children
would be balanced not against the state's compelling interest in a person
in being,. but rather against the state's interest in a statistical probability
that a fertilized ovum may be in existence."9 The dissimilarity of this
balancing, as opposed to balancing the state's interest in the life of a viable
or previable fetus against a woman's abortion right, is that in the latter
instance a person could be shown to be in existence, while in the former
positive proof of pregnancy (and therefore of the existence of a person)
could be obtained only after implantation."' Therefore, what would be
balanced against the contraceptive right is less than in the abortion of
a viable or even previable fetus. Thus, the fundamental right of a woman
to decide whether to bear a child would be balanced against the mere
probability that use of the banned contraceptive would result in the death
of a "person," a somewhat weaker interest than the state's interest in
a viable or previable fetus. Even though the state's interest in the fer-
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 156-57.
117 The dicta in Roe stated that if personhood was established the case supporting the
right to abortion would collapse. Id. Since the appellants argued for an absolute abortion
right, they necessarily controverted the appellee's contention that a compelling interest
existed in prenatal life from aid after conception because of fourteenth amendment per-
sonhood. Id. The collapse of appellants' case then, would indicate the existence of a com-
pelling interest in the life of a fourteenth amendment person. This is further bolstered
by the Court's admission that it would not have interpreted a law at issue in United States
v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), as favorable to abortion if the result were to be the death
of a fourteenth amendment person. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 159. But see 1977 Abortion
Hearings, supra note 9, at 351 (statement of Laurence H. Tribe).
"' See text accompanying notes 107-09 supra.
" See text accompanying note 102 supra.
" See notes 14 & 44 supra.
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tilized ovum may be compelling, the interest in only the possibility of
existence may not be compelling. 2' Thus, this balancing technique would
necessitate an evaluation of the different contraceptives' effects on the
fertilized ovum.
A contraceptive whose only mode of action is to destroy the fertilized
ovum is most closely analogus to the first trimester abortion which could
be outlawed if the dicta in Roe were followed." Using judicial balance,
the Court might find that the state interest in this example would be
sufficiently compelling to allow the prohibition or regulation of such a
contraceptive. However, more dubious balancing would be involved with
contraceptives that have varied modes of action, only one of which has
a destructive effect on the fertilized ovum, because the destructive mode
of action takes effect only a varying percentage of the time, depending
on the contraceptive and the individual."
A law burdening a fundamental right must be narrowly drawn to ex-
press only the legitimate state interest at stake.'24 However, it is im-
possible to predict with certainty, for a given individual, what the destruc-
tive effect of a certain contraceptive on a fertilized ovum will be."5 Thus,
if the state were to regulate a contraceptive which acted on the fertilized
ovum a specified average percentage of the time, it could be effectively
argued that the contraceptive's destructive effect on a given individual
could be much lower, and thus that the individual's access to the con-
traceptive would be limited by a law that reached overbroadly.
'Because the medical data are sparse with respect to the percentage
of time a given contraceptive interferes with the life of the fertilized
An interesting consideration is that a certain percentage of fertilized ova do not im-
plant for various natural reasons. See J. Madden, supra note 14, at 1-2. No hard data are
available as to the exact percentage, but certainly a contraceptive whose anti-implantant
mode of action occurs less frequently than nature's cannot be considered hazardous to the
fertilized ovum.
11 See notes 116-17 & accompanying text supra. The only use of such a contraceptive
would be to destroy a fertilized ovum if one were in existence. This would be similar to
performing an abortion every month whether the woman was pregnant or not.
'2 See notes 59, 67, 74, 83 & accompanying text supra.
"' See note 104 supra. Also, the more contraceptives to which access is restricted by
law the greater the infringement on the "contraceptive right" which makes it more likely
such a law would be overbroad.
1n See notes 59, 67, 74, 83 & accompanying text supra. Percentages which indicate
statistical averages mean that for a given individual the estimated effect could vary up
or down from that average. H. LARSEN, INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY THEORY AND
STATISTICAL INFERENCE 80-90 (1969). This is best understood by looking at the results of
a typical study in which a combined estrogen-progesterone morning after pill was tested.
Out of eleven patients on the drug, ovulation was prevented in three, while it was assumed
that a different mode of action was responsible for preventing pregnancy in the other eight.
While the second mode of action probably had an anti-implantation effect, it was speculated
that it might have possibly disrupted proper gamete transport, thus preventing fertiliza-
tion. See Ling, Robichaud, Zayid, Wrixon & McLeod, Mode of Action of DL-Norgestrel and




ovum,'26 it would seem that the judicial balance technique might easily
invalidate a law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives with a quan-
titatively unknown destructive effect on the fertilized ovum. The Court
could conclude that the law bears no logical relation to the compelling
interest because of its arbitrariness, and is thus overbroad in that it would
infringe unnecessarily and arbitrarily on many individuals' fundamental-
ly protected contraceptive right."
Accommodation Balancing
Judicial balancing may be unsatisfactory because it does not adequately
reflect the significance of bestowing personhood upon a fertilized ovum.
Instead, the right to life of such a person could be considered a funda-
mental right. Although the "right to life" has not been explicitly declared
a fundamental right within the modern due process structure of the four-
teenth amendment,128 it is arguably the most fundamental of all rights.'"
If the life of the fertilized ovum, as a person, is considered to be of
fundamental importance, then the appropriate balancing technique should
be an accommodation of the competing fundamental values, rather than
See notes 59, 67, 74, 83 & accompanying text supra.
A law is overbroad if "[ilt is not closely correlated to the aim of preserving prenatal
life." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 218 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); see notes 124-25 &
accompanying text supra.
128 See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 382 & n.3; Goodpaster, The
Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 479, 482-83 (1973).
" The value of life was most intensely scrutinized by the Court when it struck down
a capital punishment statute in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Although the Court
was determining whether or not the death penalty violated the eighth amendment, id.,
its reasoning is fully applicable to a discussion of life as a fundamental right. Justice Brennan
recognized that the United States was a "society that so strongly affirms the sanctity of
life ... that death is the ultimate sanction," id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring), and that
death forever ends "the right to have rights," id. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring). Of course,
like other fundamental rights, "the right to have rights" is not absolute. The right to life
may be infringed (death may be imposed as punishment) as long as aggravating circumstances
outweigh mitigating circumstances and a bifurcated trial to allow for sentencing is provided.
See Annot., 51 L. Ed. 2d 886, 898-900 (1978) (discussing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976), and Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976)). Although these prerequisites guarantee
that the imposition of the death penalty is not "cruel or unusual," id., they also act to
ensure that life is not deprived unless the state asserts a requisite compelling interest
that, on balance, weighs heavier than an individual's right to life.
Several commentators have discussed the fundamental right to life. See R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY 20-51 (1977); Destro, supra note 2, at 1326-27; Gorby, supra
note 115, at 5-7; Rice, supra note 2, at 313-17. But see 1977 Abortion Hearings, supra note
9, at 224-27 (statement of Harriet F. Pilpel).
In 1970 New York liberalized its abortion law by allowing "abortion on demand" in the
first six months of pregnancy. A trial court ruled the law unconstitutional as an infringe-
ment on the right to life of the unborn but was later reversed by an appellate court which
held that a fetus of less that 24 weeks gestation is not a person within the protection
of the fifth or fourteenth amendments. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 38
A.D.2d 316, 329 N.Y.S.2d 722 (1971), affd, 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d
390 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973).
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an attack on one fundamental value by an interest that must prove itself
to be compelling. 3 ' The closest the Court has come to this type of accom-
modation balancing in the privacy cases has been in the area of laws re-
quiring parental consent or notification for minors seeking an abortion.
Parental authority has risen to the status of a constitutionally protected
right, and could arguably be considered fundamental.131 Thus, while strik-
ing down a parental consent law in Bellotti v. Baird,"' the Court recognized
that parents have a constitutionally protected right to raise their
children." Moreover, to accommodate this right the Court recognized that
a state may determine that parental consultation is in the best interest
of a minor child, especially with respect to the abortion decision." States
may require parental consent, but must also provide an alternate pro-
cedure for the minor child to obtain judicial authorization for the abortion
if the child can show either that she is sufficiently mature to make the
decision herself, or that an abortion is in her best interest.' More recently,
a law requiring physicians to notify parents of any minor upon whom
an abortion is to be performed was held constitutional as an equitable
accommodation between the rights of the parents and the children."6 In
these cases the Court has shifted away from determining whether or not
there is a compelling interest that may validly infringe a fundamental
right, and has tried instead to accommodate parental authority over minor
children with the abortion right of minors."37
In contrast with the interpretation of the United States Constitution, West Germany's
Constitution (its "Basic Law") states: "Everyone shall have the right to life and to the
inviolability of his person:' GRUNDGESETZ art. 2, S 2. The German courts have interpreted
this clause to invalidate a law that decriminalized abortion in the first twelve weeks after
conception. However, they still allow abortion in that time period if pregnancy resulted
from a criminal assault; abortion for medical and eugenic reasons, or to relieve a woman
of a grave hardship, is also allowed. Kommers, Abortion and Constitution: United States
and West Germany, 25 AM. J. JuRis. 255, 262-63, 267 (1977). The German courts resolved
the problem of balancing life with anti-implantant contraceptives by defining life to exist
at the fourteenth day after conception. Id.
" See notes 138-45 & accompanying text infra.
"3 See Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (liberty interest in family privacy is in-
trinsic human right); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (primary role of parents in
upbringing of their children is enduring American tradition); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents have liberty to direct upbringing of their children); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (fourteenth amendment liberty includes bringing up children);
L.D. WARDLE, supra note 8, at 170-72.
13 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
"3 Id. at 638 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)). The Court has stated
that it has "recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and
child is constitutionally protected:' Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
" Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 640-41.
" Id. at 643-44, 647, 649.
"3 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
"3 The Court had previously set the limit at which the accommodating parents' interests
could not go beyond by not allowing an absolute veto over the child's abortion decision.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). Up to that point, however, the
Court allows the accommodation of parental rights through consent and notice laws. The
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In order to develop a more detailed analysis of accommodation balancing,
one must go beyond the privacy cases to recent cases involving the free
press-fair trial controversy. 13' The Court in these cases has refused to
assign a priority between the first amendment free press and sixth amend-
ment fair trial rights involved, but has rather tried to accommodate the
protected rights ."3 Because of the constitutional nature of each of these
rights, the Court has not looked for a valid compelling interest, but has
instead scrutinized the restriction protecting the fair trial right to make
sure it is not unnecessarily infringing the free press right.
Court notes that there is "an important state interest in encouraging a family rather than
a judicial resolution of a minor's abortion decision." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 648. The
Court has looked favorably on a Utah statute that enhances the potential for parental
consultation concerning the abortion decision, while infringing the abortion right only slightly.
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411 (1981). Highlighting this accommodation of rights is the
fact. that the Court recognized that a notice requirement may inhibit some minors from
seeking abortions, but determined that this does not invalidate the law. Id. at 413.
13 The cases in this area actually deal with several rights of the press protected by
the first amendment. In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), the Court
attempted to accommodate the right of the press to be free from prior restraints with
the right of the accused to a fair trial. Id. at 559-61. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U.S. 368 (1979), the issue presented was whether the press' right of access to a pretrial
judicial hearing must be accommodated by the fair trial right. Id. at 370-71, 391, 393. In
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the Court recognized a first
amendment right of the press to attend criminal trials which must be accommodated with
the fair trial right. Id. at 580.
13 In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the Court held that
the first amendment secured the right of access to criminal trials to the press. Id. at 580.
Such a right was found not to be absolute but to give rise to a presumption of an open
trial which could be rebutted to protect the fair trial right. Id. at 573, 580-81 & n.18; id.
at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Court considered alternatives which would allow ac-
commodation of the free press right, even though these alternatives would "admittedly
present difficulties for trial courts." Id. at 581.
Before Richmond Newspapers, Justice Powell recognized the same free press right, which
he considered to be equal in constitutional significance to the fair trial right. Gannett Co.
v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 397, 400 (Powell, J., concurring). He suggested the need for
"a more flexible accommodation between First and Sixth Amendment rights ... -an ac-
commodation under which neither defendants' rights [to a fair trial] nor the rights of members
of the press and public should be made subordinate." Id. at 400. Justice Blackmun in Gan-
nett thought the free press right could be restricted to protect the fair trial right, but
should be accommodated as far as possible by requiring a "substantial probability" that
a fair trial would be prejudiced, and that no alternative restrictions exist. Id. at 440-47
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
When the Court considered the question of whether a restraining order issued to the
press to protect an accused's fair trial violated the first amendment, it recognized that
the Bill of Rights did not assign priorities between the first and sixth amendments, and
therefore the Court should not. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 541, 561.
However, the Court recognized that such a restraint could be valid if it were shown that
otherwise a fair trial would be jeopardized. Id. at 570. The Court held that because a prior
restraint is the most serious and least tolerable infringement on first amendment rights,
the free press right in this instance should be accommodated if possible. Id. at 561. Justice
Powell felt that any conflict between first and sixth amendment rights could be resolved
without abrogating one or the other in that alternative measures existed which could "ensure




A general accommodation scheme can be constructed from these cases.
In order for the regulation to stand, several requirements must be met.
First, the fair trial right must be jeopardized by the unrestricted free
press right.4' Second, the restriction placed on the free press right must
be effective in protecting the fair trial right.' Third, no alternative may
exist that would adequately protect the fair trial right and would be less
restrictive of the free press right.'42 Fourth, the restriction must be nar-
rowly drawn so as to infringe the free press right only to the extent
necessary to protect the fair trial right." Obviously, these steps' valiantly
attempt to accommodate the free press right by recognizing that even
though such a right is not absolute, its importance requires an examina-
tion of the court order to make sure that such an order restricting the
press is truly necessary to protect the fair trial right. 4'
The preceding balancing procedure can be adapted to the conflict be-
tween the contraceptive right and a fertilized ovum's right to life. If a
law were enacted that infringed the contraceptive right by prohibiting
certain contraceptives in order to prevent the possible destruction of the
fertilized ovum, application of the following accommodation scheme could
test its validity. First, the life of the fertilized ovum would have to be
jeopardized by the use of the prohibited contraceptives. Second, pro-
hibiting those contraceptives would have to be effective in protecting the
life of the fertilized ovum. Third, no alternative could exist that would
adequately protect the life of the fertilized ovum without prohibiting ac-
cess to contraceptives. Fourth, the law would have to be narrowly drawn
so as to infringe the contraceptive right only to the extent necessary to
protect the life of a fertilized ovum.
In considering the first step, of the six presently available contracep-
tives, barrier methods and spermicides do not jeopardize the fertilized
ovum and the pill does so only very minimally.'46 However, the IUD, the
1.. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 580; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. at 401 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 441 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 562; id. at 571 (Powell, J., concurring).
"I, See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 580-81; Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale, 443 U.S. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
at 562.
"' See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 580-81; Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale, 443 U.S. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 441-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 562; id. at 571 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 558, 612
(Brennan, J., concurring).
"' See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 444-45
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"' A fifth step, that the press must be given an opportunity to show that either the
fair trial right is not in jeopardy or that alternatives exist which do not infringe the free
press right, is not applicable in this context. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at
401 (Powell, J., concurring); id- at 445-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf. Richmond Newspapers
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 581 (recognizing right of access of the press).
"I See note 139 supra.
... See notes 49, 53, 60 & accompanying text supra.
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minipill, and the morning after pill may arguably jeopardize life because
they act primarily to destroy the fertilized ovum." 7 Of the future methods,
Depo Provera may inhibit ovulation more than half the time, "4 ' presen-
ting a borderline case of jeopardizing life. Again, the problem arises as
to whether there is a life in existence which can be in jeopardy, because
in reality there is only a probability that a fertilized ovum is in existence,
and only a probability that it will be destroyed by a given contraceptive.
Therefore, a law restricting access to contraceptives which have various
modes of action may violate the first step of this test because of the uncer-
tainty that anything is being jeopardized. However, the experimental pro-
staglandin pill allows fertilization to occur naturally and then always acts
to destroy the fertilized ovum."' Thus, this method could easily be treated
as jeopardizing the fertilized ovum."0
As to the second step, if contraceptives whose primary action is to
destroy the fertilized ovum were banned, protection would necessarily
be effective. The law would not fully protect all fertilized ova, as some
loss would occur from other environmental conditions, but that is not a
requisite for a valid law. What is essential is that the law is effective.
That some ova die by other causes is not a ground to impugn a law which
achieves its goal of protecting ova from one prohibited cause. 5'
Step three involves the main accommodation technique: searching for
alternatives which protect both rights."' This step would at least pre-
vent a blanket prohibition of contraceptives, because there would always
exist the alternative of prohibiting just those contraceptives having a
harmful effect on a fertilized ovum. Measures less restrictive than pro-
hibiting all methods which act primarily on the fertilized ovum may also
be possible. Since women with certain medical histories should not take
the pill or the minipill, or use asi IUD, the prohibition against these
methods could be lifted for these women. However, because this may not
be administratively feasible, it would be arguable that there is no alter-
, See notes 67-68, 74-75, 80-82 & accompanying text supra.
14 See notes 91-92 & accompanying text supra.
1, See note 98 & accompanying text supra.
1 Banning this method would be analogous to banning first trimester abortions. See
note 122 & accompanying text supra.
151 On equal protection grounds it may be argued that such a law is unddrinclusive because
it burdens only users of certain contraceptives (those with a high probability of a destruc-
tive effect on the fertilized ovum) while not burdening other users whose contraceptives
also may act on the fertilized ovum (but with a lesser probability of a destructive effect).
However, the Court has not usually subjected underinclusive laws to strict review due
to the desire to let the legislature seek to solve social problems "one step at a time." William-
son v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra
note 22, at 519-22; Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REV. 341, 348-49 (1949).
15 When considering the free press-fair trial conflict, the Court always sought out alter-
natives to the restrictive order. See note 142 & accompanying text supra.
11 See notes 65, 72, 88 & accompanying text supra.
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native to banning the minipill, IUD, and morning after pill in order to
protect the fertilized ovum. For the same reasons, there may be no alter-
native to banning the two possible future methods.
The accommodation of one right with the other is also highlighted in
the fourth requirement that a restrictive law be narrowly drawn to pre-
vent unreasonable infringement of the contraceptive right. It would seem
that as long as there are reasonable substitutes for those methods which
primarily act to destroy the fertilized ovum, they could be prohibited.
However, the available information shows no clear substitutes. The pill
may not be a reasonable substitute for the minipill or the IUD because
of its estrogen-caused side effects, ' and barrier methods may not be a
reasonable substitute because of their high failure rate.'55 Therefore, a
woman's fundamental right to decide whether to bear a child is in danger
of being irreparably harmed if she is forced to use a less effective method,
or if her health may be endangered by requiring her to switch to a less
safe method. ' On the other side of the scale, there may or may not be
a fertilized ovum requiring protection. 5 ' The medical data are too sparse
to accurately identify the percentage of the time a particular method acts
on the fertilized ovum,1 ' and the actual effect of the contraceptive may
vary with the individual. '59 Thus, unless there are allowable substitutes,
the restriction of certain contraceptives may cause irreparable injury to
the contraceptive right without actually protecting a fertilized ovum. Such
a restriction would not be narrowly drawn.
CONCLUSION
If personhood were conferred on the fertilized ovum a conflict would
arise with the contraceptive right. Initially, this note analyzed the effect
of personhood on the abortion right to determine if the Court would allow
the state's interest in the new persons to prohibit abortion in the first
trimester. If it would not, then no possible infringement of the contra-
ceptive right could be justified. However, this note found that first
trimester abortions could be banned. Therefore, a balancing against the
contraceptive right would be forced by a law that limited access to cer-
tain contraceptives in order to protect the state's interest in the fertiliz-
ed ovum.
' See note 64 supra.
See notes 50-51 & accompanying text supra.
' A woman's health itself qualifies as a compelling state interest. According to Roe,
if the abortion procedure would be risky for the woman (as it is in the second trimester),
or if the fetus endangered her health, the state has an overriding interest in protecting
the health of the woman regardless of other competing interests. 410 U.S. at 163-64.
, See note 120 & accompanying text supra.
' See notes 59-61, 67-68, 74-75, 80-82, 91-92, 98 & accompanying text supra.
' See note 125 & accompanying text supra.
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To balance these competing interests, the Court might undertake the
judicial balance it has previously used in privacy cases. This note has
argued that such a balancing would find the state's interest in only a
statistical probability of a person not to be sufficiently compelling to
restrict access to any currently used contraceptives. However, the Court
might be persuaded to consider the life of the fertilized ovum as a fun-
damental right and thus use a four-step accommodation balancing tech-
nique. Such a technique gives more weight to the life of the fertilized
ovum, but even then no currently marketable contraceptives could be pro-
hibited because of the lack of reasonable substitutes, and the uncertainty
that a fertilized ovum would be endangered by a given contraceptive.
Only when the sole mode of action of a contraceptive is to destroy the
fertilized ovum, as with the prostaglandin pill currently being researched,
would a law restricting its distribution be valid.
JOSEPH W. REBONE
